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I. INTRODUCTION
Efficient management of a large, complex case, such as the one previously
described in this journal by Robert H. Gorske,' has been a challenge to jurists
since big case-litigation became commonplace in the federal courts following
World War HI. The difficulties encountered in attempting to process pro-
tracted litigation expeditiously, while simultaneously protecting the rights of
the parties and avoiding reversible error, are exacerbated by the fact that all
of this takes place within an adversarial system of justice. As Mr. Gorske
correctly observes, "In the large, complex case the parties are typically
represented by competent, even extraordinary counsel."2 And that competent
counsel can be depended upon to litigate aggressively and creatively every
step of the way, including those steps leading to the Supreme Court. With so
much at stake in the typical big case, the parties' and lawyers' resources are
usually more than sufficient to meet the opportunity or challenge.
Mr. Gorske poses the correct and intriguing question: how would, or
should, large complex cases fare in arbitration? With respect to the case that
he describes, and in which we represented the defendant contractor, the
answer is best made by noting that when it was over, $800 million in claims
had been adjudicated, in a process involving 126 days of hearings, 62
witnesses, 30,000 pages of transcript and 36 file boxes of exhibits. The fact
that the "losing" party failed to persuade the reviewing federal court that any
error had been committed in the handling of the case, and no appeal of the
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merits was taken thereafter, is testament to the care with which Chairman
Gorske and the panel of arbitrators conducted the proceedings.
3
Merely steering a "bet the company" arbitration through seas uncharted
by procedural rules adequate to the task, required Herculean effort; Mr.
Gorske is far too modest in his observation that "the procedure generally
worked in the manner intended. " Notwithstanding the panel's daring in fully
articulating their decision on the merits, and in denying ninety-seven percent
of the total of damages sought by the opposing owner of the project, the
arbitration award proved, in the end, appeal-proof and final. Resolving a
dispute of this magnitude in two and one-half years, as this panel did, would
have tested the acumen of the best of trial jurists.
We would take issue, however, with Mr. Gorske's conclusion that the case
"would have gone on much longer in the full course of court litigation."'
Even if our assessment of this issue is the correct one, it takes nothing from
the panel's personal achievements in their handling of the case; after all, they
had neither the authority of fully interpreted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to back them up, nor the judicially authored "Manual for Complex Litiga-
tion"6 to guide them along the way. Rather, they had as their compass only
the American Arbitration Association's (AAA) "Commercial Arbitration
Rules" and the AAA's "Guidelines for Expediting Large, Complex Commer-
cial Arbitrations," both of which are enormously inadequate to the job of
efficiently managing a vigorously contested, complex and protracted arbitra-
tion. Indeed, were it not for the experience, conscientiousness and, yes, plain
courage of the panel, the parties might still be at it, or, worse yet, the case
could have been remanded for further hearings until either the resolve or
resources of at least one of the parties had been exhausted.
Hidden in the footnotes of Mr. Gorske's article (and in his modesty) is a
strong clue as to why the case fared no worse than it would have in a court
resolution of the dispute. In notes 14, 20 and 22,' Gorske makes reference
3. On August 4, 1989, in an unreported opinion, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Louisiana, Judge Polozola, confirmed the arbitration award in all respects
and entered judgment upon it. Although the award itself was not appealed, the Fifth Circuit
confirmed another aspect of the case in Cajun Elec. Power Coop. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 901
F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1990). The court had previously affirmed Judge Polozola's order requiring
the parties to arbitrate in In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., 791 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1986).
4. Gorske, supra note 1, at 390.
5. Id.
6. MANUAL FOR CoMPLEx LITIGATION, § 10 (2d ed. 1985). The Manual was specifically
developed "as a result of the efforts of judges and lawyers to improve existing practices and
their willingness to innovate with the challenge of difficult problems." Id., introduction at 1.
7. Gorske, supra note 1, at 392, 396, 397.
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to the "Rules for the Non-Administered Arbitration of Business Disputes,"
issued, together with useful "Commentary" written in mid-1989, by the
Center for Public Resources ("CPR Rules")s The CPR Rules are a long-
overdue and ground-breaking approach to accommodating the large, complex
dispute to the arbitration process, even though they do not yet conquer that
elusive objective.
Although we did not realize it at the time, a number of the CPR Rules
were first flight-tested in the very arbitration described by Mr. Gorske. In
hindsight, this was unsurprising, in light of the fact that Mr. Gorske was one
of the principal architects of the CPR Rules and Commentary.9 Also, in
hindsight, it is clear that a number of procedures, adopted by the Gorske
panel only near the end of our proceedings, would have greatly expedited
resolution of the dispute and decreased its cost, had they been in place at the
outset. These procedures are now part of the CPR Rules and are discussed
below. On the other hand, the largest obstacle to expeditious and efficient
arbitration of large, complex cases was not addressed in our case, is not
adequately dealt with in Mr. Gorske's reflections in his Article, and, more
unfortunately, is only timidly confronted in the new CPR Rules. That
obstacle, which we also discuss below, is the old bugaboo of speedy civil
justice -- adversarial discovery."0
II. PREHEAING PROCEDURES
Part C of the CPR Rules contains those rules most important to efficient
management of the large, complex arbitration. This section begins with the
largest grant of authority to arbitrators ever bestowed by an initiating body.
Thus, Rule 9.1 commences with the mandate that: "Subject to the Rules, the
Tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it shall deem appro-
priate."" In case the casual reader of this Rule misses the point, the accom-
8. Copies of the Ru.s FOR THE NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION OF BUSINESS DISPUTES (Center
for Public Resources 1989) [hereinafter ARBITRATION OF BUSINESS DISPUTES] may be obtained from
the Center for Public Resources, Inc., 366 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10017. The CPR
Rules were developed by a committee of leading arbitrators and practitioners "to facilitate the
conduct of arbitration fairly, expeditiously and economically." Id. CPR Commentary at 2.
9. Mr. Gorske is a member of the CPR Committee on Private Adjudication.
10. An excellent analysis of this subject may be found in Wolfson, Addressing the
Adversatial Dilennia of Civil Discovery, 36 CLav. ST. L. REv. 17 (1988). Wolfson concludes
that adversarial discovery as it is currently practiced frustrates the stated goals of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, i.e., "to serve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action." Id. at 66. See also Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and
Discovery Reforn, 50 U. PITT. L. R . 703 (1989).
11. ARBITRATION OF BUSINESS DisprsS, supra note 8, at Rule 9.1.
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panying Commentary spells out exactly what the promulgators of the CPR
Rules had in mind:
The efficiency of the proceeding will depend in large part on the chair-
man's taking the lead in asserting the Tribunal's control over critical aspects of
the procedure, including the setting of time limits as authorized by Rule 9.2.
The Rules give the Tribunal wide latitude as to the manner in which the
proceeding will be conducted. It is expected that the procedure will be
determined in large part during the pre-hearing conference(s) held pursuant to
Rule 9.4 and that following the conference(s) the Tribunal will issue one or
more orders on procedural matters.u
With this one sentence at the beginning of Rule 9, and in one fell swoop,
the CPR drafting committee eliminated from the arbitration process, one of
the cornerstones of the adversary system of justice: the neutral and passive
fact-finder." In doing so, the Rules have made a major contribution to
establishing arbitration as a truly alternative method of complex dispute
resolution, rather than just another, not necessarily better, method for
handling the big case.
The arbitrators' grant of authority in Rule 9.1 first comes into play, under
the CPR Rules, at the prehearing conference provided by Rule 9.4. While
Rule 9.4 suggests (though it should require) a number of useful procedures,
the principal success of the prehearing conference in the case described by
Mr. Gorske was the issuance of an order requiring each party to file a
detailed Statement of Position, comparable to a pretrial brief.14 These pre-
12. Id., Rule 9 at 12.
13. For a detailed discussion of the origin, function and importance of this key element to
adversary systems, see Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System,
44 OHIo ST. L.J. 713, 714-15, 730-32 (1983) (this article was part of a larger study for the
American Enterprise Institute, S. Landsman, The Adversary System: A Description and Defense
(American Enterprise Institute 1984)).
There is an ongoing debate about the extent to which judges should depart from their
traditionally passive role. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HAiv. L. REv. 374 (1982)
(generally opposes "managerial judging" because of its tendency to increase the power ofjudges
and because it threatens impartiality and important due process rights); Miller, The Adversary
System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1, 19-22 (1984) (supports increased judicial
management as a means for decreasing delay and preventing lawyer abuse); Langbein, The
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CH. L. REv. 823 (1985) (discusses the advantages
of the German system of civil procedure in which the judge acts as the gatherer of evidence and
exercises much more control over the direction of a case than does an American judge).
14. See ARtBITArION OF BusINEss DISPUTS, supra note 8, at Rule 11.1, which provides that:
The Tribunal shall determine the manner in which the parties shall present their cases.
Unless otherwise determined by the Tribunal, the presentation of a party's case shall
include the submission of a pre-hearing memorandum including the following elements:
(a) A statement of facts;
(continued...)
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hearing memoranda contributed materially to the effective administration of
the case. By providing the arbitrators with the factual and legal background
for the parties' claims, a basis was created for the panel to decide upon the
playing field and implement certain ground rules as the case progressed.
Mr. Gorske's suggestion that overall administration of the case could have
been improved, had the prehearing memoranda been filed in advance of the
conference, is a good one. Access to the parties' Statements of Positions,
prior to the prehearing conference or to a subsequent one, would have
provided the arbitrators with a much fuller understanding of each party's view
of the legal and factual issues underlying the dispute; accordingly, this would
have permitted the fashioning, at the outset, of more detailed and reliable
guidelines and rules for the conduct of the proceedings. In a complex
arbitration, the desirability of scheduling several prehearing conferences,
prior to the commencement of evidentiary hearings, is obvious and is
suggested at the end of CPR Rule 9.4."s
It would also have been helpful if both parties had been required to
submit, prior to a final prehearing conference, an initial list of witnesses
expected to be called during each party's case-in-chief, together with time
estimates for the direct presentation of that testimony. 6 Each party should
also have been required to set forth proposed procedural approaches for the
efficient and effective administration of the case, together with a description
of the nature and extent of discovery each party needed, if any. If this had
been done, the parties and the arbitrators would have had the advantage of
considering the respective submissions and proposals; and this should have
led to a more productive discussion of the procedural and discovery issues at
the prehearing conference itself. In this way, the panel could have (1) more
accurately determined the long-term schedule for the case, (2) designated the
most logical locale for hearings, according to the collective convenience of
14. (...continued)
(b) A statement of each claim being asserted;
(c) A statement of the applicable law upon which the party relies;
(d) A statement of the relief requested, including the basis for any damages
claimed; and
(e) A statement of the evidence to be presented, including the name, capacity
and subject of testimony of any witnesses to be called and an estimate of the
amount of time required for the witness' direct testimony.
See also id. at Rules 9.4(a) and 9.5.
15. Id., at Rule 9.4 provides, in relevant part, that "[a]fter the initial conference, further
prehearing or other conferences may be held as the Tribunal deems appropriate."
16. See id. at Rule 11.1(e).
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witnesses, the parties and the panel,17 and (3) established a more expeditious
order and manner of proof."8
III. PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
Many of the procedures implemented by the panel relating to the presenta-
tion of testimony and other evidence worked very well. These procedures
included the prefiling of written testimony and exhibits,19 the direct filing of
such testimony with the panel members, self-authentication of exhibits and,
belatedly, time limits on the presentation, as well as cross-examination of
certain testimony.' All of these procedures avoided some of the more
formalistic and/or ritualistic trappings of traditional litigation, and therefore
significantly shortened the hearing time.
However, there were a number of procedures that could have been
implemented, or implemented earlier, which would have saved even more
hearing time. While in the later stages of the case the panel did impose time
limits on the presentation and ordering of evidence, and its cross-examination,
these controls would have been far more effective had they been implemented
much earlier in the proceedings. 2 In addition to general time limits, the
17. See id. at Rule 9.6.
18. See id. at Rule 11.1: "The Tribunal shall determine the manner in which the parties
shall present their cases." This implicitly includes "the mode, manner and order for presenting
proofs," see Rule 9.4(a), and explicitly, "the manner in which witnesses are to be examined," see
id. at Rule 11.4.
19. See id. atRule 11.2, which provides in part that "[e]vidence may be presented in written
or oral form as the Tribunal may deem appropriate."
20. See id. at Rule 9.2, which provides that:
The hearings shall be conducted in an expeditious manner. The Tribunal is
empowered to impose time limits it considers reasonable on each phase of the
proceeding, including without limitation the time allotted to each party for
presentation of its case and for rebuttal.
21. For example, we suggested at the prehearing conference, that each party put on its case-
in-chief without interruption, to be followed by cross-examination of these respective sections of
the case. Although this procedure was not followed initially, it was implemented and adopted for
the presentation and cross-examination of the parties' respective rebuttal cases. This separation
of direct and cross-examination not only greatly increased the coherence of the presentation of
evidence, but significantly reduced the amount of time taken up by cross-examination.
The complete denial of cross-examination in a civil case would probably amount to a denial
of due process. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (in a criminal case the right to
examine adverse witnesses is a due'process right), but merely separating direct from cross-
examination in an arbitration hearing would not violate any constitutional rights. Cf. Papapetrop-
oulous v. Milwaukee Transport Serv., 795 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1986) (denial of full cross-
examination in employment termination arbitration hearing is not a denial of due process);
(continued...)
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panel early on should have refused to permit "live" testimony, where cross-
examination had been waived, based on pre-filed testimony, or multiple
appearances of the same witness.' Not only would such procedures have
shortened the hearing time, they also would have forced the parties to make
more productive use of that time. Any such limits would, of course, have
been subject to modification had the circumstances warranted.'
Finally, a more active role could have been assumed by the panel in the
examination of witnesses.' This would have helped focus the presentation of
evidence, and its cross-examination, on the areas of real interest to the
arbitrators. We suspect this was not done by our panel, out of fear that one
party might subsequently argue that the panel's questions indicated pre-
judgment of issues and, hence, deprivation of a fair hearing. It bears noting,
21. (...continued)
Benjamin v. Traffic Exec. Ass'n Eastern R.Rs., 869 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1989) (court upholds
arbitration decision even though cross-examination was restricted).
The effectiveness and usefulness of cross-examination has been criticized. See Langbein,
supra note 13, at 834 n.31 ('In the hands of many of its practitioners, cross-examination is not
only frequently truth-defeating or ineffectual, it is also tedious, repetitive, time-wasting, and
insulting.')
22. See ARSITRArION OF BUSINESS DISPUTES, supra note 8, at Rules 11.2 and 11.4.
23. In his reply to this article, Gorske, A Reply, 6 OHIO ST. J. ON Dis. RES. 77 (1990),
[hereinafter Gorske's Reply], Mr. Gorske acknowledges that, "The Arbitrators simply had no
way of reliably determining what restraints could reasonably be imposed without improperly
impeding the fair presentation of ... evidence.' Id. at 79 (emphasis supplied). This confirms
our belief that the real reason behind the arbitrators' failure firmly to control the proceeding was
the panel's fear of committing reversible error. However, given the deference accorded
arbitration decisions and the extremely limited grounds for review, see supra note 21 and infra
note 34, we believe that such fears were unfounded and, in any event, prolonged the proceedings
and increased their expense.
24. FED. R. EvID. 614 permits federal judges in their discretion to both call and question
witnesses, although the power is not often exercised. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, 3 WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDE.NCE 614[01] (1990) [hereinafter WEINSMN's EvIDENcE] (quoting Judge Learned Hand: "A
judge is more than a moderator; he is charged to see that the law is properly administered, and
it is a duty which he cannot discharge by remaining inert.'). The advisory committee's notes to
Rule 614 indicate that judicial questioning of witnesses more often occurs in criminal trials than
in civil cases. The committee's notes also state that the authority to question witnesses is abused,
'when the judge abandons his proper role and assumes that of advocate .... ' However,
reversals for improper questioning are rare. Id. at 614[03] n.8.
In comparison to the U.S. system, judges serve as the "examiner-in-chief" in the German
system of civil procedure with the lawyers for the parties asking questions only after the judge
has completed his examination. See Langbein, supra note 13, at 828.
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however, that judges frequently display the same reluctance, in adherence to
their role as "neutral and passive fact-finders."'
IV. CPR SE1rm mENr AND DECIsIoN PROCEDURES
Gorske notes that at one point in the proceedings, and with the consent of
the parties, the panel proposed a format for settlement discussions, along the
lines of a mini-trial and away from the hearing and knowledge of the arbitra-
tors.' This suggestion, though complied with by the parties, and now
embodied in CPR Rules 9.4(d) and 17, bore no fruit. This was because of
two principal reasons unrelated to the intransigence of either or both parties:
first, the contractual obligation to arbitrate is itself an acknowledgement by
the parties, in advance of disputes arising out of the contract, that it makes
more sense to settle than to litigate. Once arbitration proceedings actually get
underway, however, the parties have decided, in effect, that they cannot settle
the dispute by themselves, but need knowledgeable, objective and outside help
to do it for them.' Parties to arbitration agreements rarely need to be
reminded of the benefits of settlement.
Second, and most importantly, arbitrators usually confine their role to
"passive" fact-finders,' as did Chairman Gorske and his panel until near the
25. As Professor Landsman argues:
Adversary theory further suggests that neutrality and passivity are essential not only
to ensure an evenhanded consideration of each case, but also to convince society that the
judicial system is trustworthy; when a decision- maker becomes an active questioner or
otherwise participates in a case, society is likely to perceive him as partisan rather than
neutral. Judicial passivity thus helps to ensure the appearance of fairness.
Landsman, supra note 13, at 715.
26. Gorske, supra note 1, at 389.
27. Recently, one of our clients was sued by its joint venture partner in defiance of an
arbitration clause, accompanied by demands for immediate and large-scale discovery. Upon
receipt of our motion to compel arbitration, the litigious partner promptly agreed to negotiations,
obviously preferring to settle without outside intervention and on terms it could control. In this
case, the mere threat of arbitration led to the parties' decision to settle their differences on their
own.
However, despite anecdotal evidence to the contrary, see WILKINSON, DONOVAN, LEiSURE,
NEWTON & IRVIN ADR PRAcTICE BooKc 13 (1990), arbitration does not necessarily lead to faster
disposition of cases than does traditional settlement discussions in the context of litigation. In a
recent Rand Corporation study of court-annexed arbitration in a North Carolina federal court, the
cases assigned to arbitration were concluded in an average of 285 days as compared to 282 days
for nonarbitrated cases. Wall St. J., Sept. 5, 1990, at B10, col. 2.
28. As Professor Landsman further states, "[Aidversary theory suggests that if the decision-
maker strays from the passive role he risks prematurely committing himself to one version of
the facts and failing to appreciate the value of all the evidence." See Landsman, supra note 13,
(continued...)
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close of the proceeding." Traditionally, arbitrators will refrain from interim,
dispositive rulings, comments or requests for evidentiary or legal support
found wanting in one or both parties' claims. Without these signals along the
way, which commonly occur in judicial proceedings, both parties may remain
deeply in the dark surrounding the realities of their chances for success or the
extent of their exposure. This is precisely what happened in our case, and
constituted the principal barrier to settlement. Neither party had any reliable
basis to predict, beyond his own intuitive judgment, what the final award
would bring. Fortunately for our client, ours turned out to be the better
guess, though there were some sleepless nights right to the end, not unlike the
gut-wrenching wait for a jury to return.
A number of provisions and suggestions in the CPR Rules and Commen-
tary can, if followed, help the parties to achieve more realistic and earlier
estimates of their chances or exposure in the case. These include early
rulings on key issues of law,3" early identification and narrowing of issues
(Rule 9.4(b)), bifurcation of issues (Rule 9.4(a)) and interim and partial
"awards" (Rule 13.1).
Rule 11.3, authorizing the arbitrators to require parties to produce evi-
dence in addition to that initially offered, can also provide effective and
valuable inroads to unfounded optimism of either or both parties. Requests
that a party submit more or different factual or legal support for theories or
claims, sends a strong signal that a significant portion of a litigant's case is
in trouble.3 ' This device, if it is fair to call it that, was used only once in
28. (...continued)
at 715. See also Resnik, supra note 13, at 426-31, in which Professor Resnik argues that
participation by judges in supervising cases can lead to predispositions that are no less objection-
able than prior involvement with the parties or a financial interest; both of which are grounds for
disqualification. However, the contrary view is that fact-finding left to lawyers in the adversary
system does not necessarily lead to the truth and that fact-finding by a neutral but not passive
judge is superior. See Langbein, supra note 13, at 841-48. Professor Langbein advocates the
German system which combines neutral but active fact-gathering by the judge with full
adversarial activity in the realm of identifying legal issues and in legal analysis.
29. In reply to this article, Mr. Gorske strongly supports a passive role for arbitrators, and
the importance of the appearance of neutrality. See, e.g., Gorske's Reply, supra note 23, at 80-
81. This ideological expression explains (and confirms the accuracy o0 our quarrel with the
panel's failure to exercise more control over the proceedings. As we argue, the panel's
adherence to this hallmark of the adversarial system of justice prolonged the proceedings and
underscores, in our mind, the importance of CPR Rule 9 in furthering the time and cost-saving
objectives of arbitration in the big case.
30. See ARBITRATION OF BUSINESS DISPUTES, supra note 8, Commentary, Rule 9 at 12.
31. Judges, even in criminal cases, have a right to suggest that a party has failed to sustain
its burden of proof on a particular issue. 3 WEIN srIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 24, at 614102]
text & n. 18 (quoting United States v. Ramos, 291 F. Supp. 71 (at conference in chambers, court
suggested that government had introduced insufficient evidence on one issue; government then
(continued...)
69
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
the early days of the hearings (and then, either ignored or misunderstood by
our opponent). After all the evidence was in, however, the panel assertively
requested the parties to calculate damages in a different way, and to support
certain legal theories with additional authority. By then, unfortunately, it was
too late; with the award then only weeks away, no major reassessment of the
parties' own judgment on the outcome proved possible. Rule 11.3 is, of
course, antithetical to the adversary process, and therein lies its value if
arbitration is to at least pull even with court litigation in the fostering of
settlement.3 2
Finally, our arbitrators presaged the promulgation of CPR Rule 13.2 by
rendering an award that stated fully the reasoning upon which it rested. The
CPR Commentary well articulates the soundness of this rule in noting, that
requiring arbitrators to spell out their reasoning is "good discipline for
arbitrators," it requires them to give "second thoughts" to the soundness of
their decision, and should restrain "any tendency on the part of arbitrators to
reach compromise awards," i.e., to "split the baby."' We would add that a
fully explained award may, in fact, diminish the likelihood that it will be
overturned by a reviewing court, given the widely-accepted standard that
arbitrators need not correctly apply the law, as long as it has not been
manifestly disregarded.34 In our case, the award acknowledged the panel's
31. (...continued)
requested, and was given, leave to reopen; held not prejudicial. The trial judge's function was
not merely that of an umpire, but to bring forth all relevant facts. Suggestions made by trial
judges to prosecutors concerning elements of proof and appropriate lines of inquiry have often
been held proper even when made in the presence of the jury), affid, 413 F.2d 743 (1st Cir.
1969).
32. Rule 11.3 allows the arbitration panel, in its discretion, to copy some of the aspects of
the approach mandated in German civil procedure in which the judge has the primary responsibil-
ity for developing and investigating the facts and in selecting and questioning expert witnesses.
Langbein, supra note 13, at 825.
33. ARBITRATION oF BUSINESS DIsPuTES, supra note 8, Commentary, Rule 13 at 14.
34. Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int'l Mktg. S.A., 811 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1987); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[Ihe term
'disregard' implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal
principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.") The courts have adopted this stringent
standard for reversal because otherwise, it would "undermine [the courts'] well-established
deference to arbitration as a favored method of settling disputes when agreed to by the parties."
Id. Cf. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482-U.S. 220 (1987) (Court reaffirms its
reluctance to overturn arbitration awards).
In addition to "manifest disregard" of the law, additional grounds for vacating an award are
available pursuant to the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 which reads in part:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
(continued...)
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awareness of critical legal doctrines, even if it could have been argued on
appeal (which it was not) that they were not correctly applied.
V. DiscovERY PROCEDURES
Both the panel and the authors agree that discovery worked less efficiently
and effectively than anticipated. There is a difference in view, however, as
to why that happened.
As Mr. Gorske states, from the outset "the board determined that it would
be liberal in directing discovery."' Under this approach (which sent an open
invitation to counsel to crank up the discovery machine), broad, full-scale
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure discovery was permitted during breaks
between hearing weeks, upon a showing of even marginal relevance. Such
broad-based discovery was disruptive to expeditious hearings and, at times,
consumed the panel's and the parties' time on insignificant and/or irrelevant
issues. Unfortunately, discovery was used to frame the issues,36 rather than
the far more appropriate converse.37
34. (...continued)
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
35. Gorske, supra note 1, at 384.
36. While Mr. Gorske disagrees with this observation, Gorske's Reply, supra note 23 at
79, our point is proven by his simultaneous acknowledgement that, "The principal issues resolved
in the award were almost precisely the issues set out by the parties two and one-half years earlier
in the preliminary statements they filed with the arbitrators." However, the initial and adversarial
statement of the issues set forth by the parties, were never narrowed thereafter by discovery or
ruling by the arbitrators, but were in fact sustained and augmented principally because full
discovery was allowed on each of them and their sub-issues. That the issues were well-defined
before discovery, according to each party's view of its own case, also supports our contention
that neither party really needed massive discovery and that almost all of it was cumulative. Had
some of those issues, identified at the outset, been decided, eliminated or narrowed early in the
arbitration, the need for further discovery on those issues would not have been necessary, or
could at least have been limited, and the proceedings thus simplified. Moreover, the influence
of the discovery on the evidence presented often manifested itself in the form of both sides
fighting to maintain the balance in the amount ofevidence in the record. Little wonder then, as
Mr. Gorske acknowledges at page 79, that numerous discovery documents were entered as
exhibits. We would argue that this in no way supports the "fairness" or "appropriateness" of the
far-reaching discovery permitted in our proceedings.
37. The Federal Rules of Evidence specifically allow broad discovery as is indicated in the
Notes of the Advisory Committee to the 1946 Amendments to Rule 26 in which the Committee
cites language that, ". . . the Rules . .. permit 'fishing' for evidence as they should." Olson
Transp. Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 8 Fed. R. Serv. 34.41 (Callaghan 1944).
Unfortunately, in practice, discovery is often both overused, as a means to flood an opponent
with burdensome requests in an effort to force settlement, and misused, as in the case ofavoiding
(continued...)
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We believe the panel's liberal approach to discovery, in a case in which
both parties had a wealth of information available in their own files, and had
equal resources and sophistication, was a serious mistake. As too frequently
happens in the big case in court, liberal discovery created the single largest
obstacle to expeditious and efficient resolution of the dispute." Had the panel
been less permissive, and had they exerted the broad powers and control that
the arbitration process grants them, the proceedings would have ended far
sooner, but with, we suggest, the same result. An arbitration panel must not
leave discovery to the parties, but should affirmatively and closely control
it.39 In order to do this, the panel must narrow the issues of the case early
on, and permit discovery only on these defined issues, and only when a party
can show palpable need.'
37. (...continued)
the disclosure of information that is the subject of a valid discovery request. Wolfson, supra note
10, at 42. Recent amendments to the discovery rules have been in the direction of requiring
increased judicial supervision to control discovery abuses. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory
committee's note.
Brazil has pointed out in his study of discovery, Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the
Pre-trial Development of Civil Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981
Am. B. FOuND. REs. 3. 873, 905, that failure to narrow contested issues prior to beginning
discovery significantly reduces the efficiency of pre-trial preparation. Brazil notes criticism of
the approach taken in the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIoATION, supra note 6, which does not
encourage judges to attempt to define issues early in the process, but instead allows an initial
"wave" of discovery the purpose of which is to identify the sources of discoverable information.
Only after this initial, and usually huge, wave of discovery are the issues narrowed.
38. See Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems
andAbuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 827 (Brazil's research indicates that lawyers who
primarily handle big cases were very dissatisfied with discovery practice and a large part of that
dissatisfaction was a result of the delay attributable to discovery).
39. Brazil concludes in his study, supra note 37, at 884, that discovery in an adversary
system is in "desperate need of external control." Control of discovery by the parties has not,
and given the adversary system, cannot work.
40. There is an internal inconsistency between the CPR Rules and the commentary on
discovery that demands correction. While CPR Rule 10 requires the arbitrators to permit and
facilitate discovery, the commentary sends a different message:
Arbitration is not for the litigator who will "leave no stone unturned." Unlimited
discovery is incompatible with the goals of efficiency and economy. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are not applicable. Discovery should be limited to that for which a
party has a substantial, demonstrable need.
ARBTRA'tioN OF BUSINEss DispuTs, supra note 8, Commentary at 12 (emphasis added).
The approach of the Commentary is far superior to that of the Rule itself, which should be
subordinated or amended to reflect this.
Attempts to narrow the scope of discovery from all "relevant" material to something more
akin to "need" under the Federal Rules have not been successful. Wolfson, supra note 10, at 47
(continued...)
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Finally, procedures adopted in the final stages of the proceedings, such as
deferral of cross-examination until whole sections of testimony had been
presented, and depositions of scheduled witnesses (especially experts)
immediately prior to their appearance, should have been implemented at the
outset and would have reduced cross-examination time enormously.4'
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the complexity and scope of the case, the fact that the dispute was
not processed any more expeditiously in arbitration than it would have been
in court, was no surprise. That it fared as well, was a surprise, given the
fact that procedures for arbitrating the big case had yet to be adequately
designed, and the fact that the panel initially took their places as "neutral and
passive" fact-finders. It is naive to believe that "competent, even extra-
ordinary counsel," each representing clients with large sums of money, or
rights at stake, will agree after the dispute has arisen, upon rules that will
materially expedite the proceedings or render them less burdensome.' This
40. (...continued)
n.190. However, it should be noted that discovery reform under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure has revolved around increased judicial supervision of discovery. Failure of arbitrators
to closely supervise discovery may eliminate any advantages arbitration has over litigation. Mr.
Gorske states in his reply that "discovery in the case was closely supervised by the arbitrators"
and that "fairness required much ... of the discovery in the case." Gorske's Reply, supra note
23 at 78 (emphasis supplied). This misses the point, we suggest; the far more precise standards
of "control" and "substantial demonstrable need" should be the guideposts.
41. See ARBITRATION oF ButSNEss DISPUTES, supra note 8, at Rule 9.4(a).
42, This phenomenon has been previously described. Professor Arthur R. Miller writes:
Unfortunately, however, the ideal of a smooth pretrial process engineered and controlled
by the attorneys has not been realized, especially in complex and difficult cases. The
vision that adversarial tigers would behave like accommodating pussycats throughout the
discovery period, saving their combative energies for trial, has not materialized. Given
the realities of modern large-scale litigation, the rulemakers' expectations for a self-
executing cooperative pretrial phase have proven to be somewhat naive.
Miller, supra note 13, at 15. In the specific context of pre-trial discovery see also Wolfson,
supra note 10, at 49-51 ("The process can only work effectively if the pretrial disclosure of
information is substantially nonadversarial, yet the ethical, professional, and societal framework
in which lawyers function is highly client-oriented ...with little or no incentive to aid the
opposing side or the legal system itself.") Wolfson goes on to suggest that the lawyers failure to
act in a sufficiently adversarial manner might reasonably be considered a breach of the ethical
code which requires a lawyer to "represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law."
Id. at 49-50. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNstu~rY EC 7-1 (1980).
A study conducted for the American Bar Association, reported in three parts, bears out the
fact that lawyers do not cooperate in the discovery process, especially in big cases, but rather
treat discovery as just another part of the adversarial process. Brazil, supra note 38, at 810 ("In
the adversarial system it's one group's job to get information and the other's not to give it to
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is particularly true if agreement is sought on rules that in any way disrupt the
balance of tactical, factual and legal advantages each party perceives it owns
at the outset. An adversarial system of justice does not work that way; if
adversaries in a hotly contested dispute could agree between themselves, in
advance of hearing or trial, upon the important rules of the contest, they
could very likely settle the case. To test the validity of this proposition, one
needs only to imagine what complex federal court litigation would be like,
deprived of the imposition of the Manual for Complex Litigation or the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not to mention Rule 11.'
Arbitration, at its best, is a counterpart, not an adjunct, to the adversarial
system of justice revered by some, though by no means all, of the republic's
lawyers, jurists and legislators. It is for this reason that arbitration has
traditionally eschewed formal rules of evidence, procedure and other legal-
isms, going so far as to permit arbitrators, as well as parties, to sit without
benefit of legal education or license to practice! In disputes that involve
neither huge sums of money, nor enterprise-threatening claims, nor numerous
and vastly complicated issues of fact and law, it works very well. When
some or all of those factors are present in a dispute, however, the informali-
ties of arbitration may serve to defeat the very objectives of expeditious and
efficient resolution of disputes which the system was designed to achieve.
The new CPR Rules, however, point the way toward solving the dilemma
of accommodating the arbitration process to the large, complex case, without
rendering arbitration just another, not necessarily better, way to resolve this
type of dispute. The key is the grant in CPR Rule 9 to, and utilization by,
arbitrators of more, not less, control over the conduct of the proceedings, and
control that can withstand attack on appeal." Only toward the end of the big
42. (...continued)
them."); Brazil, supra note 37, at 882 ("[The assumption that the discovery system would be
efficient and effectivein big cases, while remaining substantially self-executing and self-policing,
was misplaced."); Brazil, Viewsfronz the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About
the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 217. But see Gorske's Reply, supra
note 23, at 79.
43. The contribution made by FED. R. Crv. P. I I to efficient and fairly dispensed justice
is not without debate. As with the Loch Ness Monster, Rule II's salutary effects have been
more often discussed than actually observed. For a general overview of Rule 11 and its effects,
see Shaffer, Rule 11: Bright Light, Dint Future, in SANcroNs: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS 1 (C.
Shaffer & P. Sandier, 2d ed. 1988). Substantial criticism has been directed at Rule I I's practical
application, including charges that Rule 11 is unpredictable and incoherent in its application and
that too vigorous enforcement of the Rule may deny due process rights. See 5A WRIGHT &
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2d § 1332 (1990); Note, Plausible Pleadings:
Developing Standards For Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARv. L. REv. 630 (1987).
44. If rules such as the ones promulgated by the AAA or CPR are adopted by reference in
the contractual arbitration clause itself, they become fully enforceable. See, e.g., Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1976). Even if such rules are not
(continued...)
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case, chaired by Mr. Gorske, was such control imposed unilaterally and, as
it turned out, without objection or appeal. Had that control been exercised
earlier, we would have been able to concur wholeheartedly that this big case
was more efficiently and expeditiously resolved than it would have been in
court. Maybe, next time.
44. (...continued)
adopted by the arbitration clause, parties could reasonably and correctly agree to be bound by
some or all of them at the outset of the proceedings, a difficult though not impossible endeavor.

